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The Collision Between 
New Discovery Amendments 
and Expert Testimony Rules 
by Paul F. Rothstein 
The young litigator's nightmare was always the same. He was 
in medieval Europe, ready to engage in a sword fight with the 
expert swordsman representing his arch rival. After countless 
hours of preparation, he felt confident that he would be able to 
hold his own against the swordsman. But when the swords-
man drew his lengthy rapier from its sheath, the young 
attorney pulled only a short dagger from his scabbard. Real-
izing that he was doomed to defeat, he tossed his dagger into 
the air and ran from the scene with the laughter of the 
onlookers ringing in his ears. 
The young litigator needed no dream analyst to tell him the 
nightmare's symbolism. He knew that the sword fight repre-
sented cross-examination and that his swordsman opponent 
was simply an expert witness. As hard as he practiced and 
studied and researched, he never felt comfortable cross-
examining his opponent's expert about the expert's field of 
expertise. He might as well admit his failure now and become 
a tax attorney, he thought. . 
Fear of expert witnesses can indeed be disabling. With the 
increase in litigation about complex business transactions, 
products liability, and professional malpractice, expert testi-
mony continues to become more important. The modern 
litigator must learn to deal effectively with opposing experts 
or be faced with the embarrassment of his worst nightmares. 
Handling the opponent's expert has become more difficult 
because the rules of evidence have been liberalized over the 
years, while the rules of discovery recently have been re-
stricted. 
Relaxing the evidentiary rules has increased the scope of 
expert trial testimony. Matters formerly thought to be solely 
in the province of the jury have become a kind of star wars-
an intense courtroom battle between stellar experts in their 
fields. At the same time, restrictions on discovery about expert 
witnesses make it more difficult to cross-examine experts 
effectively. 
Mr. Rothstein is a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, 
Washington, D.C. 
Expert witnesses provide valuable assistance to the triers-
of-fact, but unscrupulous "hired guns" can hoodwink them. 
Sadly, the full disclosure essential to sort the charlatans from 
the genuine experts often falls victim to the move to restrict 
discovery. Either the balance must be struck between pretrial 
disclosure and evidentiary rules at trial, or control of the 
courtroom must be relinquished to those who have become 
expert at testifying. 
Typical of modern evidentiary provisions encouraging the 
broad use of experts is Article VII of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Article VII-and indeed, most of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence-is copied by the evidence codes and the rulings 
of most states. 
Article VII relaxes former restrictions on the use of experts 
in the following ways: 
( 1) A lay witness may give opinions and conclusions if they 
are rationally based on the witness's perception and are 
"helpful" to the fact-finder. Rule 701, Fed. R. Evid. This 
replaces the common-law test that allowed lay testimony in 
opinion or conclusion form only if it was "essential." Under 
the common law, the opinion or conclusion was inadmissible 
unless it was necessary as a kind of shorthand to express a 
collection of underlying facts that could not be articulated 
separately. 
(2) The class of witnesses who can be considered "experts" 
is expanded beyond those with formal education and degrees 
in the subject under consideration, and now includes people 
who gained their special experience or skill in the school of 
"hard knocks," namely, through practical, on-the-job experi-
ence. Rule 702. 
(3) No longer must a matter be totally beyond the knowl-
edge and experience of lay jurors for it to be appropriate for 
expert testimony. It is enough that, although lay jurors may 
know quite a lot about the subject, an expert could be of some 
assistance to them. Rule 702. 
(4) The open-court hypothetical question no longer is the 
only or even the preferred format for presenting testimony of 
an expert who has not personally observed the facts. Alterna-
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tives include (a) facts given to the expert beforehand, perhaps 
by the lawyer who expects to present the expert; or (b) facts 
obtained by the expert from reading trial or deposition tran-
scripts or listening to witnesses at the trial. Rules 703 and 705. 
Rule 615, covering sequestration of witnesses, also must be 
considered when this method is used. 
(5) Expert witnesses may base their opinions even on 
inadmissible evidence, if the court believes such evidence to 
be the sort that experts in the field normally and reasonably use 
in their practices. Rule 703. 
(6) The basis of the expert's opinion (the facts supplied to 
him or her and the materials upon which he or she relies) need 
not be expressly included in the testimony elicited by the 
direct examination. Rule 705. 
(7) An expert may give an opinion on the ultimate fact at 
issue in the case, as long as the other standards are met. Rule 
704. 
These liberal rules mean several things. First, there are more 
experts and more kinds of experts. Second, experts now may 
testify on the conclusive issue and they may not be as "expert" 
as they used to be. Moreover, the Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Evidence notes that most former objections, 
including weakness of qualifications, now are a matter of 
weight rather than admissibility. Finally, experts may be 
permitted to use even unreliable material and distorted facts 
(perhaps fed to them by a lawyer) and to keep the fact-finder 
in the dark about this. 
The obvious antidote is to allow extensive discovery of 
experts' qualifications, proposed testimony, and bases for 
opinions. Indeed, against a background of full discovery, the 
relaxed evidentiary rules make sense: They shift some of the 
spadework out of the courtroom. Assuming that both lawyers 
are competent and forearmed, there is no reason why the 
lawyers cannot expose the strengths and weaknesses of expert 
testimony to the jury. 
But "forearmed" is the key, and often the difficulty. Discov-
ery is restricted in criminal cases; yet the relaxed evidentiary 
rules apply. Disclosur~ is broader on the civil side, but 
recently there has been concern about too much discovery in 
civil cases, a concern that was codified in 1983 by amending 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, most notably by adding 
Rule 26(g). In the words of the Advisory Committee, this rule 
"is designed to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encourag-
ing the imposition of sanctions." 
More specifically, the rule requires the attorney requesting 
discovery to certify that the request is consistent with the 
rules; is not interposed for an improper purpose, such as 
harassment or bad faith; and is "not unreasonable or unduly 
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the 
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, 
and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." A 
companion provision requires-surprisingly for our adver-
sary system-that the attorney consider in this computation 
"the limits on (both) parties' resources" and the availability of 
the information from other less burdensome, less expensive, 
or more convenient sources. Rule 26(b )( 1 ). If a certification is 
made in violation of the rule, the court "shall" impose mone-
tary or other sanctions on the offending party or the party's 
attorney. If imposed on the attorney, the sanctions may not be 
passed on to the client. 
Armed with this comparatively recent amendment, some 
lawyers have become enthusiastic about asking for-and 
getting-sanctions against other lawyers because somebody 
believes that the lawyer has done more discovery than neces-
sary. By couching proper discovery in terms of what is "not 
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive" to the 
system and to both parties and by tying these considerations 
to such factors as the needs of a given case, the amount in 
controversy, and the importance of the legal issues, the draft-
ers of the rules have created a significant hazard for the trial 
attorney. Should the lawyer try to get as much information as 
possible, or should the aim be to curtail efforts in the face of 
possible sanctions against the lawyer or the client? 
When the lawyer poses this question with respectto discov-
ery about an expert, the expanded scope of the evidentiary 
rules heightens the problem. The discovery rules and the 
evidentiary rules about expert testimony are on a collision 
course, and the trial lawyer is caught in the middle. 
Here is a typical scenario. 
You are preparing for a civil trial in which you will represent 
the defendant. The kind of trial does not really matter, except 
that it will involve expert witnesses and it will take place in 
federal court or in the courts of one of the many states that have 
procedure and evidence rules essentially the same as those that 
apply in federal courts. 
You have made a request under Rule 26 for information 
about your opponent's experts, and have learned (1) the 
identity of the plaintiff's expert witness, Harold Jones; (2) that 
Jones will render an opinion on X at trial; and (3) the basis for 
this opinion. The entire Rule 26 statement was drafted by 
opposing counsel. It is somewhat informative, but only barely 
above minimal compliance with the rule. 
Moreover, the Rule 26 notice is ambiguous about whether 
Jones also might venture an opinion on a matter other than X. 
The notice contains some general language that could be read 
to mean that an opinion on Y might be given, and to give a 
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sketchy basis for such an opinion. Arguably, the information 
could be seen as complying with the notice rule for Y as well 
as for X. 
Nevertheless, you decide not to depose Jones. First, a 
deposition would be expensive-more so even than a nonex-
pert deposition, since the federal rules provide that deposi-
tions of opposing experts require a court order and also make 
it likely that the party taking the deposition will have to pay 
certain additional costs. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) and (C). Because 
you have good expert help of your own, you feel that you are 
able to plan an attack on Jones without a deposition. 
Another consideration underlying your decision not to 
Experts now may testify 
on the conclusive issue-
and they may not be as 
••expert" as they used to be. 
depose Expert Jones is your fear that the judge (who at this 
stage may not be well-informed of the facts of the case or may 
see things differently) might apply the new sanctions provi-
sion of Rule 26(g). This provision encourages sanctions 
against lawyers themselves if discovery later is deemed by the 
judge to have been unnecessary or unduly expensive or 
burdensome in light of the circumstances of the case. 
Moreover, you believe that the opinion on Yprobably will 
not be part of the expert's trial testimony, especially since Y 
does not seem central to the case. Indeed, discovery concern-
ing the opinion on Y would be hard to justify to a judge not 
thoroughly familiar with the case. Such justification would be 
required to obtain a court order for the deposition, and might 
also be required to defend against any motion for sanctions for 
excessive discovery under Rule 26(g). 
Finally, you do not want to be forced to disclose your whole 
case in an attempt to justify a deposition of Jones, but that is 
exactly what you may be required to do if you litigate the issue. 
And if Jones testifies about Y at trial, you conclude that you 
will obtain the basis for his opinion without discovery: Jones 
will have to disclose the basis during direct examination. Your 
experts will be sitting at counsel table, and you can consult 
with them regarding Jones's testimony. In addition, you may 
be able to convince the judge not to allow Jones to testify at all 
on Y, or at least not to allow Jones to give a full basis for his 
opinion on Y, since the notice was ambiguous and sketchy. 
Once your decision is settled, you sit back and wait for trial to 
begin. 
The first monkey wrench thrown into your plans is that the 
plaintiffs lawyer convinces the judge, pursuant to Rule 615, 
Fed. R. Evid., that your experts should not be allowed to 
remain in the courtroom during any of the testimony, includ-
ing the testimony of the plaintiff's expert. A portion of the 
argument at the bench might sound like this: 
Defendant's lawyer: I respectfully request that my ex-
perts be allowed to remain at counsel table, or at least that 
one of them be allowed to remain. This is a technical case. 
I need to have the advice of my experts as the testimony 
unfolds. I invoke the exception to sequestration recognized 
in Rule 615 itself-for"a person whose presence is shown 
by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause." 
Judge: I don't think that the presence of your expert is 
essential. You've had plenty of opportunity to discover, 
evaluate, and consult with your own experts before trial. 
Furthermore, I don't think that this case is unusually 
technical. And the subjects on which the experts are going 
to testify in this case, although important, are not the central 
issues. So the presence of your experts is not essential. 
Defendant's lawyer: Your Honor, the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence state time and again that a major purpose of the 
Article is to provide streamlined alternatives to the cum-
bersome, lengthy, argumentative, and judicially ineffi-
cient institution of the open-court hypothetical question to 
experts. In particular, Rule 703 provides that the facts used 
by an expert "may be those perceived by or made known to 
him at or before the hearing," and Rule 705 dispenses with 
"prior disclosure" of the facts that the expert is using, the 
prior disclosure being the hypothetical question. The 
Advisory Committee Notes to these rules express the 
intention to allow the expert to receive the facts in ways 
other than by the traditional hypothetical question. In 
particular, the rules contemplate allowing the expert to 
receive the facts by listening to the fact witnesses at trial. 
In addition, the rule requiring sequestration, like all 
witness sequestration rules, is intended to guard against a 
particular danger-namely, that fact witnesses may influ-
ence each others' stories without the fact-finder realizing 
it. This danger is not present when an expert listens to fact 
witnesses and frankly states that his opinion is based on the 
assumption that the facts are as the fact witnesses have 
testified. The expert makes it clear that he is not testifying 
that these facts are true, but only that his opinion is based 
on these facts. It is up to the jury to determine whether or 
not the facts are true. There is thus no danger of the kind that 
Rule 615 addresses. 
Judge: Your arguments are good ones, but I have ruled 
that sequestration will apply and I will not change my 
ruling. 
Not a Setback 
The judge's decision is a setback, but not a major one, you 
think. Your experts still will be available to discuss the issues 
between trial sessions, and your familiarity with the technical 
issues will enable you to relate the testimony to them. But you 
begin to wonder whether you would have been better off 
risking sanctions and trying to obtain expert Jones's deposi-
tion. 
Expert Jones takes the stand and gives his opinion on X, 
together with its basis. 
The following colloquy then takes place during his direct 
examination: 
Q. Mr. Jones, do you have an opinion on Y? 
Defendant's lawyer: Your Honor, I object. I was not 
properly notified that an opinion on Y would be given. I 
haven't had a chance to prepare. This is a surprise to me. 
Plaintiffs lawyer: Your Honor, I call your attention to 
the notice we gave pursuant to Rule 26. It advises of the 
possibility of an opinion on Y and gives its basis. In 
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addition, under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the Advisory Committee expressly notes that it has deleted 
the notion that surprise can be a ground for exclusion of 
otherwise admissible evidence. 
Judge: The opinion on Y will be admissible. I think 
plaintiff's counsel has complied with his obligation to 
notify you of Y. 
Defendant's lawyer: Then, Your Honor, I ask for a voir 
dire out of the hearing of the jury to explore this expert's 
basis for his opinion on Y. 
Judge: As you yourself pointed out, Rule 705 does not 
require that the basis be given in advance of the expert's 
opinion. 
Defendant's lawyer: Your Honor, the information given 
in the Rule 26 notice from my opponent was hardly 
sufficient to give me the basis of this expert's opinion on 
Y. I don't know if he personally examined the evidence and 
formed his opinion, or if he instead got the facts from the 
lawyer. I don't know what facts may have been given to 
him, or what kinds of inadmissible or hearsay materials he 
may be relying on. He may be relying on third- and fourth-
hand information from people who had no personal knowl-
edge or who had an interest in the outcome of this case. 
Judge: Your objection is overruled. Rule 703 doesn't 
preclude an expert from relying on inadmissible material, 
as long as it is of the kind that experts in the field reasonably 
use. You 'II get your chance to show that it isn't that kind 
when you cross-examine. Your arguments simply bear on 
weight, not admissibility. 
Defendant's lawyer: Well, in the alternative, I would 
like to request a continuance now, or at such time as the 
witness gives his basis, to prepare to meet this surprise. 
Judge: My docket and the number of people waiting to 
be heard make that absolutely out of the question. Anyway, 
you had notice. Proceed with the direct examination. 
Plaintiff's lawyer: Mr. Jones, what is your opinion on Y? 
Jones: My opinion on Y is ... (A damning opinion against 
the defendant is given in impressive terms. One brief 
sentence of superficial reasons is given, with no insight 
whatsoever into the expert's basis.) 
Plaintiff's lawyer: No further questions. 
Your mind races. You cannot possibly decide whether to 
cross-examine or not, and what to ask or not to ask. What 
bases or reasons will Jones have? Will your questions 
trigger helpful or harmful responses? Are there any weak-
nesses in Jones: s opinion, oris it so strong you should leave 
it alone? If there are weaknesses, what are they? What are 
the strong points to leave alone? 
Defendant's lawyer: Your Honor, may we approach the 
bench? (At the bench:) Your Honor, I've been given 
nothing on which to fashion my cross-examination. 
Judge: You should have thought of that in discovery. 
Rules 703 and 705 provide that the expert need not give you 
a basis on direct examination. Rule 705 provides that you 
can get it on cross-examination if you want. The expert has 
complied with the minimal requirement of Rule 705 that 
the expert must give a reason for the opinion. 
Defendant's lawyer: No questions of the witness, Your 
Honor. 
Your decisions during pretrial discovery were reasonable. 
Had you not made them, you may have been sanctioned for 
unnecessary discovery. Moreover, your legal arguments at 
trial were sound. So why are you facing a difficult dilemma? 
The primary culprit is the tension between two opposing 
drives-the desire to get as much information as possible 
about the expert's opinion and the desire to avoid being 
punished for what may be viewed as excessive discovery. 
Indeed, in light of the new standard of Rule 26(g), lawyers 
must think seriously not only about what is good for their own 
case and client, but also about the economic and practical 
impact of discovery on their opponent. 
The passage of the recent amendments to Rule 26 marked 
a dramatic break with the past. For example, in the 1970 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Advisory Committee had stated that in cases presenting "in-
tricate and delicate issues as to which expert testimony is 
likely to be determinative ... a prohibition against discovery 
of information held by expert witnesses produces in acute 
form the very evils that discovery was created to prevent. 
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires 
advance preparation." 
By contrast, the more recent amendments take an entirely 
different approach: "Concern about discovery abuse led to 
widespread recognition that there is a need for more aggres-
sive judicial control and supervision." Discovery of experts 
was perceived as one part of the problem. 
Get It at Trial 
The defense attorney in our trial scenario, caught between 
the objectives of getting information about the opposing 
expert's opinions and avoiding the risk of discovery sanc-
tions, thought the answer that would accomplish both objec-
tives was to get the missing information from the expert at 
trial. The problem with this solution was that, while discovery 
was being restricted, expert trial testimony was being ex-
panded. In other words, the Federal Rules of Evidence had 
blocked the doorway to discovery during trial. 
The changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence may well 
have been based on the assumption that information regarding 
the expert and his or her opinion would be readily available 
through discovery. The Evidence Advisory Committee, in 
(Please turn to page 56) 
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Affidavit 
Evidence 
(Continued from page 44) 
I Wigmore On Evidence § 4 (Tillers 
rev. 1983) contains a valuable discus-
sion of the evidentiary status of affida-
vits in ex-parte proceedings and motion 
hearings that Wigmore styled "adver-
sary interlocutory proceedings." Pro-
fessor Wigmore believed that the rules 
of evidence should not apply in a hear-
ing on a request for preliminary equi-
table relief. Wigmore, § 4 at 44-45. 
Professor Moore goes farther, contend-
ing that a court "may properly consider 
affidavits at the preliminary injunction 
hearing, which do not measure up to the 
standards of the summary judgment 
affidavit. ... " 7 Moore's Federal Prac-
tice (Part 2), § 65.04[3) at 65-88. 
(Summary judgment affidavits, accord-
ing to Rule 56(e), "shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evi-
dence, and shall show affirmatively that 
the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein.") Professor Till-
ers, however, claims the evidence rules 
do apply. He invokes, among other 
things, Rule IIOI(b), Fed. R. Evid., 
which states that the rules of evidence 
apply "generally to civil actions and 
proceedings .... "Footnote 16 of Wig-
more§ 4. 
A Red-Faced Court 
Isn't Professor Tillers on thin ice 
claiming that no rule allows the use of an 
affidavit in connection with a hearing on 
the merits regarding a preliminary in-
junction? What about Rule 43(e), Fed. 
R. Civ. P.? See Murray v. Kunzig, 462 
F.2d 871, 878-879 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 
reversed on other grounds sub. nom. 
Sampson v. Murray4I5 U.S. 61 (1974). 
For that matter, Rule 6(d), Fed. R. Civ. 
P. (providing for the time of serving 
affidavits relating to motions), assumes 
that factual matters relating to motions 
may be raised by way of affidavit. 
While on the subject of"affidavits," it 
is worth noting that a somewhat red-
faced Ninth Circuit had to withdraw its 
decision in Zepeda v. United States 
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 
36 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 906, 911, 708 
F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1983), withdrawn, 
amended opinion issued 40 Fed. Rules 
Serv. 2d 1285, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 
1985). The original opinion had trum-
peted that unsworn declarations, even if 
made under penalty of perjury, were not 
proper "affidavits" within the meaning 
of Rule 43(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., in support 
of a preliminary injunction. This gaffe 
was silently dropped from the amended 
version. 
Numerous cases fly in the face of 
Professor Tillers's theory that affidavits 
cannot be relied upon for preliminary 
injunctions. See Federal Savings & 
Loan Insurance Corp. v. Dixon, 835 
F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1987), and 
S.E.C. v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also United States 
v. Fox, 211 F. Supp. 25, 30 (E.D. La. 
1962), aff'd., 334 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 
1964): 
.. .in a proceeding for preliminary 
injunction oral testimony, al-
though permissible, is not abso-
lutely required. The court may 
receive and consider both affida-
vits and other documents which 
are the equivalent of affidavits. 
But when the fur begins to fly in the 
form of conflicting affidavits and coun-
teraffidavits, the appellate courts be-
come restive without more trustworthy 
evidence in the record. See Fengler v. 
Numismatic Americana, Inc., 832 F.2d 
745 (2d Cir. 1987). See also 11 Wright 
& Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure: Civil § 2949 at 480. Judge 
Godbold's decision in Marshall Durbin 
Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Org., 
Inc., 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971), can-
vasses these problems. That court set 
aside a preliminary injunction obtained 
with the help of a "flood of additional 
affidavits" (446 F.2d at 353) deluged on 
opposing counsel at the last minute in 
violation of Rule 6(d), which the court 
found applicable to motions for prelimi-
nary injunctions (446 F.2d at 358). 
Some of these offending affidavits were 
on "information and belief." 
In the final analysis, Ko-Ko's eviden-
tiary proposal to Nanki-Poo was super-
ficially in accord with the stricter stan-
dard for a summary judgment affidavit a 
Ia Rule 56( e), Fed. R. Civ. P. It contem-
plated the affiant's vivid, eyewitness 
account of the execution. Nonetheless, 
it was grossly tainted, as cross-examina-
tion or even a prehearing deposition 
would have revealed: 
Litigation Spring 1988 56 Volume 14 Number 3 
Ko-Ko: Here are plenty of wit-
nesses-the Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
High Admiral, Commander-in-Chief, 
Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, First Lord of the Treasury, and 
Chief Commissioner of Police. 
Nanki-Poo: But where are they? 
Ko-Ko: There they are. They'll all 
sweartoit-won'tyou?(ToPooh-Bah.) 
Pooh-Bah: Am I to understand that all 
of us high Officers of State are required 
to perjure ourselves to ensure your 
safety? 
Ko-Ko: Why not? You 'II be grossly 
insulted, as usual. 
Pooh-Bah: Will the insult be cash 
down, or at a date? 
Ko-Ko: It will be a ready-money 
transaction. ~ 
Collision 
(Continued from page 20) 
drafting the expert testimony provisions 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, ex-
pressly predicated their work on the 
liberal availability of discovery: 
(Article VII) assumes that the 
cross-examiner has the advance 
knowledge which is essential for 
effective cross-examination .... 
Rule 26(b )( 4) of the (Federal) 
Rules of Civil Procedure (as then 
constituted) provides for substan-
tial discovery in this area, obviat-
ing in large measure the obstacles 
which have been raised in some 
instances to discovery of findings, 
underlying data, and even the 
identity of experts. 
The drafters' intentions may have 
been noble, but the drafters did not fore-
see the future. They did not predict the 
change of heart about discovery in civil 
cases. They did not anticipate the 1983 
amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which made discovery, 
including discovery of experts, more 
difficult and even perilous. (And they 
seem to have overlooked altogether the 
situation of restricted discovery that has 
always existed in criminal cases.) 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence are on 
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a collision course. Each assumes that the 
other body of rules will make available 
the information necessary to expose 
false prophets masquerading as experts. 
Both are mistaken. 
Several steps can be taken to avoid the 
dilemma faced by the trial lawyer in our 
example. 
Learn About the Expert 
(l) First, and most obviously, the at-
torney might seek more exhaustive pre-
trial disclosure. In arguing that pretrial 
discovery of an expert's opinion is not 
excessive, the attorney should point out 
that Rules 703 and 705 may prevent 
disclosure at trial of the information 
underlying the expert's opinion. Conse-
quently, pretrial discovery may be the 
only way to determine the basis of your 
opponent's expert testimony. 
(2) If expert disclosure is inadequate 
for whatever reason, the lawyer should 
consider filing a motion to exclude all or 
part of the expert's testimony. Rule 403 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence codi-
fies the trial judge's discretionary power 
to exclude any otherwise admissible 
evidence because it is prejudicial, time 
consuming, misleading, or cumulative. 
Surprise, a permissible ground for 
exclusion under prior law, is conspicu-
ously absent from the list in Rule 403. 
But it may be there in some other lan-
guage. In arguing for the exclusion of 
some or all of an expert's testimony, the 
attorney should use words that are in the 
rule to express the same thought. Thus, 
the attorney should argue that there is a 
danger of "prejudice" or of "misleading 
the jury"-that evidence the lawyer was 
not able to study, evaluate, and prepare 
for may appear to be stronger than it 
really is, since the weaknesses will not 
be shown. 
This is particularly true with expert 
testimony, which has an extraordinary 
effect on the jury and which the jury 
cannot effectively evaluate without 
help. Further, the attorney should argue 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Advisory Committee expressly predi-
cated deletion of "surprise" on the 
grounds that there will no longer be 
surprise, because of discovery and con-
tinuances-neither of which occurred 
in our trial scenario. Remember, though, 
that the discovery rules in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure do allow ex-
clusion of "surprise" evidence if the 
surprise is due to failure of the introduc-
ing party to comply with discovery. 
(3) In addition to the arguments made 
in our hypothetical, five points can be 
raised to strengthen the attorney's re-
quest at trial for the basis of the expert's 
opinion: 
(a) Rule 705 expressly gives the 
judge discretion to depart from its 
ordinary proscription and to require 
earlier disclosure of the basis of an 
expert opinion. No standards are 
provided for the exercise of that dis-
cretion, but a good argument in its 
favor is that full information forming 
the basis of the opinion has not been 
given in discovery. Emphasize that it 
is virtually impossible to fashion a 
proper cross-examination and en-
lighten the jury about any weak-
nesses in the expert testimony with-
out having the basis of the opinion in 
advance. Point out that, in this situ-
ation, cross-examination probably 
will not be attempted-not because 
the opinion is sound, but because of 
uncertainty about what the witness 
will say. 
(b) Rule 705 does not, in so many 
words, expressly prohibit voir dire. 
That is only an inference from its 
provision that the opinion may be 
given "without prior disclosure" of 
basis, "unless the judge requires oth-
erwise." Argue that voir dire should 
be allowed to enable you to learn the 
basis of the expert's opinion. 
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(c) While Rule 705 dispenses with 
the requirement of prior disclosure of 
basis, that is, before the opinion is 
given, the rule does not address dis-
closure during the direct exam but 
after the opinion is given. Disclosing 
basis at that time still may be re-
quired. Again, argue that disclosure 
by way of voir dire may solve the 
problems created by the tension be-
tween discovery and evidentiary 
rules. Although not an ideal solution 
for the attorney opposing the expert, 
it is better than leaving matters until 
cross-examination. The disclosure of 
basis may take place out of the jury's 
hearing, and could result in the opin-
ion being stricken (or at least weak-
ened) immediately. 
(d) Rule 705 provides that "[t]he 
expert may testify in terms of opinion 
or inference and give his reasons 
therefore without prior disclosure of 
the underlying facts or data, unless 
the court requires otherwise." "Rea-
sons" could and perhaps should be 
read to embrace much more of what 
the expert uses to reach his conclu-
sion than was given in our trial sce-
nario. 
(e) Important policy considera-
tions favor allowing prior discovery 
of expert information: As a result of 
not getting the information about 
basis in advance of cross-examina-
tion, the lawyer may decide to forego 
cross or may conduct an inadequate 
cross. Either of these alternatives 
serves the system badly. An unex-
plored or inadequately explored (and 
thus perhaps faulty) opinion may get 
to the jury. In the absence of good 
exploration, this opinion may appear 
deceptively forceful. 
(4) Finally, as a last resort, cite the 
practice of a number of federal district 
judges who prohibit testimony that is 
substantially greater than the statement 
furnished pursuant to pretrial discovery. 
The dilemma of the trial attorney may 
not be completely solved by broadening 
the scope of pretrial discovery relating 
to expert witnesses. But finding ways to 
obtain the expert's opinion and basis 
beforehand will go a long way toward 
giving the lawyer the tools essential to 
turning the battle with the expert witness 
into a fair fight. 
In the words of our opening allegory, 
it may give the lawyer a full-length 
sword. l!:;l 
